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Abstract
Wireless sensor network (WSN) commonly requires lower level security for public informa-
tion gathering, whilst body sensor network (BSN) must be secured with strong authenticity to
protect personal health information. First in this paper, some practical problems with the Mes-
sage Authentication Codes (MACs), which are suggested in the current security architectures for
WSN, are reconsidered. The analysis exploits the fact that the recommended MACs for WSN,
e.g., TinySec (CBC-MAC), MiniSec (OCB-MAC), and SenSec (XCBC-MAC), are not exactly
suitable for BSN. Particularly a dedicated attack is elaborated on the XCBC-MAC. Considering
the hardware limitations of BSN, we propose a tunable lightweight MAC based on the PRESENT
block cipher, which is named TuLP. A 128-bit variant TuLP-128 is proposed for a higher resis-
tance against internal collisions. Compared to the existing schemes, our lightweight MACs show
better performance and higher energy-efficiency at lower memory usage.
Key words. Message authentication code, Body sensor network, Resource-constrained implementation.
1 Introduction
Body sensor network (BSN, also called wireless medical sensor network) [34], which can be devel-
oped from wireless sensor network (WSN), is a key technology for long term monitoring of biological
events or any abnormal condition of patients for realizing the Ambient Assisted Living (AAL) vision
[1]. Although the fact that large groups of patients already carry individually implantable or wearable
monitoring equipments, a biosensor array (also implantable or wearable) offers a more accurate status
than one isolated device. To offer more personalized health care to elderly or disabled patients, the
gathered health information will instantly be sent to the server of a clinic or hospital, which will be
monitored by doctors (or nurses) to prevent the occurrence of fatal events. Since BSN nodes are either
∗The first author acknowledges the financial support of SenterNovem for the ALwEN project, grant PNE07007. The last
author is supported by NSFC (No.60803146) and National Basic Research Program (973) of China (No.2007CB311201).
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worn or implanted by a patient, the power consumption should be low to minimize radiation and max-
imize durability. Moreover, BSN sensors also have limited computational ability and memory. These
factors are important not only in the implantable but also in the external sensor settings because they
determine how “hidden” and “pervasive” the sensors are. Table 1 shows the specifications of typical
BSN nodes in practice.
Traditional WSNs are used to collect public information in the environment, such as temperature,
humidity, fire alarm, etc. Since monitored health data from a person with BSN will be a part of per-
sonal Electronic Health Record (EHR), a higher level of assessment and protection is required for BSN
communications. The existing EHR standards (ISO 27001, 27799, openEHR/ISO 18308, etc.) oblige
BSN to be secured with strong cryptography. However, strong cryptography entails more resources.
Considering the highly constrained resources that a BSN node can have, a better trade-off has to be
found such that the security is maximized, while minimizing the resources. Unfortunately, because of
the heterogeneity of BSN, the secure protocols for static networks might not applicable for BSN. Also
the methods proposed for ad hoc networks such as asymmetric cryptography techniques would be
costly for BSN applications. Due to the constraints in power consumption and computational ability,
it remains a great challenge to design secure and practical cryptographic primitives which are both
time and resource efficient for BSN applications.
TI Node1 MICAz Node2 MyriaNed3
CPU 16bit, 8MHz 8bit, 16MHz 16bit, 32MHz
RAM 2KB 4KB 8KB
Flash Memory 64KB 128KB 128KB
Voltage 1.8 ∼ 3.6v 2.7 ∼ 3.3v 1.6 ∼ 3.6v
OS TinyOS TinyOS MyriaCore
Table 1: The specifications of typical BSN nodes.
Related Work. To ensure the authenticity and integrity of WSN communication, security protocols
via different Message Authentication Codes (MACs, different from the term “Medium Access Con-
trol”) are proposed. MAC is a symmetric-key primitive that inputs a key-message pair to produce a
unique tag. The integrity and the authenticity of the message are protected by the tag and the key
respectively. One widely used method is the Security Protocol for Sensor Networks (SPINS) [29],
which consists of µTESLA (micro version of the Timed, Efficient, Streaming, Loss-tolerant Authen-
tication) and SNEP (Secure Network Encryption Protocol) for broadcasting messages. Following
SPINS, many lightweight security architectures have been proposed for WSN, e.g., TinySec [22],
SenSec [25] and MiniSec [26]. All these architectures considered which MAC will be suitable in the
WSN packet/message authentication. For instance, TinySec and MiniSec recommend the well-known
CBC-MAC [22] and OCB-MAC [26] respectively, whilst SenSec uses a novel scheme called XCBC-
MAC [25]. All the recommended MACs are based on the operation modes of block cipher, and suggest
32-bit length tag for WSN. In contrast, since dedicated hash functions (such as MD5 and SHA-1) are
primarily designed to be collision resistant for preventing forgery of digitally signed documents, it
was exploited that MACs based on hash functions (e.g., HMAC [3]) might be less competitive than
1Texas Instruments. http://focus.ti.com/lit/ds/symlink/msp430f149.pdf.
2Crossbow. http://www.xbow.com/products/Product pdf files/Wireless pdf/MICAZ Datasheet.pdf.
3ALwEN project. http://www.atmel.com/products/AVR/default xmega.asp.
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block-cipher-based ones for highly constrained devices [14]. Nevertheless, it is recognized by the
BSN research community that authentication in BSN protocols is usually for short messages [18] in
network processing. This property implies that the candidates of MACs, which focus more on the
one-wayness than on the collision-resistance, will be more practical for BSN applications.
Since typical BSN nodes have limited resources, an appropriate security level should be imposed
to realize authenticity and confidentiality in applications. Intuitively, 32-bit security level for WSN
is not suitable even for the one-wayness of the transmitted data in BSN. As a comparable case for
sensitive data authenticity, the authentication of Electronic Funds Transfer in the US Federal Reserve
System uses a 64-bit CBC-MAC, and additionally a secret value for IV is daily changed and safely
kept by the member banks. In other applications, certain authorities even recommended to implement
a MAC with a longer length of 128-bit. Although an appropriate security level for BSN applications
will be ensured case by case, but 64-bit security bound is widely-accepted for resisting sensible threats
in such constrained devices. As power and RAM are normally the most constrained resources on a
BSN node, the design of a MAC should consider applicable trade-offs towards time and resource effi-
ciency in practice.
Our Contributions. The contributions of this work are three-fold. Firstly, we describe some prac-
tical problems of the MACs recommended in popular security architectures for WSN, such as Tiny-
Sec (CBC-MAC), MiniSec (OCB-MAC) and SenSec (XCBC-MAC). Especially we demonstrate an
existential forgery attack on XCBC-MAC, which implies that the authenticity of SenSec is broken.
Secondly, a performance comparison is presented on efficient MACs from different design principles,
e.g., CBC-MAC, OCB-MAC, ALPHA-MAC [16]. Thirdly, taking into account the requirements for
authenticity in BSN, we propose a tunable lightweight MAC based on the PRESENT block cipher
[13], which is named TuLP. The structure of TuLP is inspired by the generic construction ALRED
[16]. A 128-bit variant TuLP-128 is proposed for the higher resistance against internal collisions.
Compared to the existing schemes, our lightweight MACs show a better performance on MICAz node
with less memory usage in ROM/RAM, and also energy-efficient in the level of gate equivalents.
Organization. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes some defi-
nitions and notions which will be used throughout the paper. The problems with the MACs recom-
mended in the proposed security architectures for WSN are described in Section 3. Section 4 gives
a performance comparison of some efficient MACs for BSN authenticity. The designs of TuLP and
TuLP-128 follow in Section 5 along with a detailed analysis of the security and the performance.
Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Preliminaries
Here we review some definitions and primitives which will be used in the following sections. Exclusive-
or (xor) will be denoted by ⊕. a||b denotes the concatenation of two strings a and b. Let M and K be
the message and key spaces respectively.
2.1 Cryptographic Primitives
ALRED. The ALRED construction is a generic MAC design introduced by Daemen and Rijmen [16].
The ALRED construction consists of the following steps:
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1. Initialization: Fill the state with an all-zero block and encrypt it with a full encryption E with
an authentication key k.
2. Chaining: For each message, iteratively perform an injection layout to map the bits of the
message to the same dimensions as a sequence of r round keys of E. Then apply a sequence of
r times round function of E to the state by using the output of the injection layout as the round
keys.
3. Finalization: Apply a full encryption E with the authentication key k to the final state. The tag
is the first `m bits of the output.
Based on the ALRED construction, Daemen and Rijmen also presented two paradigms called
ALPHA-MAC [16] and Pelican [17], by using AES as the underlying block cipher. Recently, many
papers exploited that ALPHA-MAC and Pelican might be threatened under the internal collisions [21],
the side-channel attack [9] and the impossible differential analysis [33]. We note that all those crypt-
analyses are based on the internal structures of ALPHA-MAC and Pelican, which do not endanger the
security of the generic construction of ALRED.
PRESENT. At CHES 2007, Bogdanov et al. proposed an ultra-lightweight block cipher which is
named PRESENT [13]. PRESENT is an example of an SP-network and consists of 31 rounds. The
block length is 64 bits and two key lengths of 80 and 128 bits are supported. The hardware require-
ments for PRESENT are competitive. Using the Virtual Silicon (VST) standard cell library based on
UMC L180 0.18µm 1P6M Logic Process (UMCL18G212T3), PRESENT-80 and PRESENT-128
are estimated to require 1570 and 1886 gate equivalents, respectively [13]. Since Bogdanov et al. do
not expect the 128-bit key version to be used until a rigorous analysis is given, the term PRESENT
means 80-bit key version in hereafter. A high-level algorithm of the round function of PRESENT
is depicted in Figure 1: First, 64-bit input of the round function is xored with the subkey ki. The
total 32 subkeys (k32 for whitening after the final round) are derived from the key schedule algorithm
over an 80-bit secret key. Next, 16 identical 4× 4-bit S-boxes S are used in parallel as the non-linear
substitution layer. Finally, a bit-oriented permutation, which will be extremely hardware-efficient, is
executed to provide diffusion.
Figure 1: Round function of PRESENT [13].
Further details about the specification of PRESENT can be found in Bogdanov et al. [13], in-
cluding basic results of the differential and linear cryptanalyses, which can be summarized as follows.
Theorem 1 Any five-round differential characteristic of PRESENT has a minimum of 10 active S-
boxes.
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Theorem 2 Let ²4R be the maximal bias of a linear approximation of four rounds of PRESENT.
Then ²4R ≤ 2−7.
Based on PRESENT, Bogdanov et al. [14] propose some low-energy block-cipher-based hash
functions (e.g., single and double block length construction DM-PRESENT and H-PRESENT re-
spectively) which are more practical than dedicated or AES-based hash functions in highly constrained
devices, such as RFID tags. Recently, many cryptanalysis results have been given on the PRESENT
block cipher. Wang [32] presents a new differential attack on 16-round PRESENT with the com-
plexities of about 264 chosen plaintexts, 232 6-bit counters, and 264 memory accesses. Collard and
Standaert [15] show a statistical saturation attack against 24 PRESENT-80. The saturation attack
depends on a simplified key schedule algorithm such that the same subkey should be used in each
round. O¨zen et al. [27] provide a related-key rectangle attack on 17-round PRESENT-128. However
the known attacks on full PRESENT with 80-bit keys, without any simplification, so far are bounded
with 16 rounds [32].
2.2 Authentication Modes in BSN
A typical BSN involves three kinds of communication: off-body communication, on-body commu-
nication, and in-body communication. For protecting both authenticity and confidentiality, the data
payload of each packet in a BSN should be encrypted, and then authenticated with the header (includes
nonce, source, destination and group ID, etc.) by the sender before it is sent to the receiver. Figure 2
shows two different paradigms to build up a secure packet with the properties of authenticity and con-
fidentiality. The left paradigm is borrowed from Rogaway’s Authenticated Encryption with Associate
Data [30]. If the message is long, the authentication includes the full ciphertext will be costly.
P laintext
Ciphertext 1Tag
Autenticated Encryptio n
Ciphertext 1TagHeader
Ciphertext 1Tag 2Tag
M AC
Applicatio n Layer
Netwo rk Layer
Data Link Layer
Header
P laintext
Ciphertext
Encryptio n
CiphertextHeader
Ciphertext 1Tag
M AC
Applicatio n Layer
Netwo rk Layer
Data Link Layer
Header
Sho rt message effic ient paradigm Lo ng message effic ient paradigm
Figure 2: Two authentication paradigms for BSN.
The right paradigm trades off the overhead on an extra tag to avoid the authentication costs on the
full ciphertext. Let k be an authentication key shared by a sender and a receiver. When a packet has
arrived, the receiver first checks if MAC(k,Header,Tag1) = Tag2. If it does not hold, the receiver will
just ignore the packet without decryption. Otherwise the receiver checks the validity of the ciphertext
through the equation MAC(k,Ciphertext) = Tag1, and then decrypts it to obtain the valid plaintext. If
the underlying authentication encryption and MAC function are secure, Tag2 protects the authenticity
and integrity of the header and Tag1, whilst Tag1 protects the original plaintext.
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A widely-known result [6] states that communicating a single bit of data consumes several orders
of magnitude more power than executing a basic 32-bit arithmetic instruction. If the message is
short, one can choose Rogaway’s Authenticated Encryption with Associate Data paradigm since the
communication costs on the extra tag will be larger than the authentication which includes the full
ciphertext. Otherwise, the right paradigm might be efficient since both the sender and the receiver
require less computation on authenticating with a long ciphertext. No matter what authentication
mode is opted, the security and performance of the underlying MAC function will play a pivotal role
for BSN security.
3 Problems with the MACs Recommended for WSN
For ensuring the security of the communication in WSN, many schemes have been proposed for the
different layers of WSN. Basically, data link layer security is fundamental for other security prop-
erties in the higher layers, e.g., secure routing in network layer and non-repudiation in application
layer. In practice, there exist three widely-cited schemes for the security of data link layer, which
are TinySec [22], SenSec [25], and MiniSec [26]. For confidentiality, all the three schemes suggest
using a lightweight block cipher for data encryption. But for authenticity, three totally different MAC
functions are recommended, which are claimed to be suitable for WSN. In this section, we will give a
comparative analysis of the three recommended MAC functions in the three schemes [22, 25, 26].
CBC-MAC. In TinySec [22], Karlof et al. suggest to use CBC-MAC [4] as the underlying MAC
function. CBC-MAC uses a cipher block chaining construction for computing and verifying MACs.
The first advantage of CBC-MAC is simplicity, as it relies on a block cipher which minimizes the
number of cryptographic primitives that must be implemented on BSN nodes with a limited memory.
CBC-MAC is provably secure as well [8]. For BSN applications, the disadvantage of CBC-MAC is
that independent keys should be used for encryption and authentication. Furthermore, the standard
CBC-MAC construction is not secure for variable length messages. Adversaries can forge a MAC
for certain messages. To preserve the provable security for variable length messages, a variant of
CBC-MAC uses three different keys for the authentication [11]. The three-key construction solves
the variable length message problem, and avoids unnecessary message padding, but it raises another
typical risk with respect to the key management in BSN. Compared to the one-key constructions, the
extra keys will impose a heavy burden on the key generation, distribution and storage, which indicates
that CBC-MAC might be less practical for BSN applications.
XCBC-MAC. The XCBC-MAC algorithm proposed by Li et al. in [25] is part of the authenticated
encryption mode for SenSec. Let kA and kE be the authentication key and the encryption key, respec-
tively. Let message M = m1||m2||...||mt. Figure 3 depicts the construction of XCBC-MAC. In gen-
eral, the XCBC-MAC algorithm can be viewed as a variant of the two-key CBC mode. Unfortunately,
we have found a practical existential forgery on XCBC-MAC by implementing a chosen-message at-
tack. One can easily build two different messages with the same tag under the XCBC mode. The
forgery can be described in the following steps:
1. First, adversary A obtains IV, EkE (IV) from the first block of any former ciphertext under kE .
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Figure 3: The XCBC algorithm proposed in SenSec [25].
2. Next,A requests the encryptions on the two different blocks EkE (IV )⊕m1 andEkE (IV )⊕m′1
in the XCBC mode. The ciphers will be EkE (m1)⊕IV and EkE (m′1)⊕IV. A obtains EkE (m1)
and EkE (m
′
1) by xoring the ciphers with IV .
3. Finally, A arbitrarily chooses a padding message M ′, and then outputs two different messages
M1,M2, whereM1 = EkE (IV )⊕m1||EkE (m1)||M ′ andM2 = EkE (IV )⊕m′1||EkE (m′1)||M ′.
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Figure 4: An existential forgery under the XCBC-MAC.
Based on the above attack, the two different messages M1 and M2 will have the same MAC
since both the prefixes EkE (IV) ⊕ m1||EkE (m1) and EkE (IV) ⊕ m′1||EkE (m′1) produce the same
zero output to the next step. The attack is difficult to detect since the prefixes are computationally
indistinguishable from a randomized query. The attack on XCBC-MAC cannot be avoided by a ran-
domized IV, since IV should be a public-known value and all nodes use the same IV. If IV is frequently
changed, all nodes should be synchronized, otherwise the receiver cannot correctly decrypt the packet
from the sender. Since synchronization is costly in BSN, it is impractical for an IV to be distributed
just for one-time usage. Due to the above attack, the XCBC-MAC algorithm proposed in SenSec [25]
is insecure under the chosen message attack and should be abandoned in any circumstance of authen-
tication.
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OCB-MAC. In MiniSec [26], Luk et al. suggest using the OCB mode [31], which is an efficient
authenticated encryption scheme, as the MAC function for message authenticity and integrity. Since
its publication OCB has received some attention, but little cryptanalysis. We believe this has two
reasons. First, a proof of security seems to imply that cryptanalysis is useless. The proof is quite
complicated and analysis of the proof details is restricted to those people who are well-versed in formal
proof techniques. Second, the OCB mode has been patented. There is a significant cost, both directly
and indirectly, associated with using a patented algorithm. The last reason is the main reason for the
lack of rigorous cryptanalysis. Spending time on OCB will only help the patent-holders to sell their
licenses without any further compensation to the cryptanalyst. Moreover, Ferguson also presents a
collision attack on OCB with arbitrary length messages [19]. To keep adequate authentication security
of OCB, one has to limit the amount of data that the MAC algorithm processes. Since the offset values
used in OCB require extra time/memory costs with respect to the message length, the area and the
power consumption will be increased for the computation and storage. The above reasons are relevant
to real-life applications on BSN, and cast doubts on the wisdom of using OCB.
4 A Comparison of Some Practical MACs for BSN
We have shown that the MAC functions proposed for WSN in the literature are not exactly suitable
for BSN. Many different MAC Functions have been proposed in the past decades. Driven by the
highly constrained resources of BSN node, the performance and security of those candidates should
be rigorously examined before they are implemented. Basically, there are three approaches towards
designing MAC functions. The first is to design a new primitive from scratch, such as UMAC [10].
The second is to define a new mode of operation for existing primitives. Such as variants of encryption
modes of block ciphers: CBC-MAC [4] and OCB-MAC [31]; Or variants mode of hash functions:
HMAC/NMAC [3, 7]. The third approach, which can be viewed as a hybrid of the first and the second
approach, is to design new MAC functions using components of existing primitives, such as ALPHA-
MAC [16].
Based on the security and performance requirements of BSN, we will give a detailed compar-
ison of some popular MAC candidates, which are claimed to be efficient from the three different
approaches. To be fair, all MACs based on block cipher use AES-128 as the underlying block cipher,
as well as input messages can be of arbitrary length. The timing of the keysetup and the message
processing are estimated from the performance data given by the NESSIE consortium [5] (Pentium
III/Linux Platform), such that the message processing time is measured in cycles/byte, while the key-
setup and keysetup + finalization are measured in cycles. The area in gate equivalents (GE) can be
calculated from two parts: the area of the underlying component or primitive, and the area for internal
operations and storages. In order to compare the area requirements independently it is common to
state the area in GE, where one GE is equal to the area which is required by two-input NAND gate
with the lowest driving strength of the appropriate technology [28]. By following the same method
[14, 18], we also use the Virtual Silicon (VST) standard cell library based on UMC L180 0.18µm
1P6M Logic Process (UMCL18G212T3) to estimate each area in GE of the candidates. According to
the related experiments [18], the area GE for AES-128 encryption is estimated to be 3400 GE, as well
as 64-bit storing and exclusive-or require 512 GE and 170 GE, respectively.
For chips built with CMOS technology, the power consumption is the sum of two parts: the static
and the dynamic costs. The static part is roughly proportional to the area, namely the larger size of the
chip the larger energy costs, whilst the dynamic part is proportional to the operating frequency. For
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CBC-MAC [11] OCB-MAC [31] ALPHA-MAC [16] HMAC/SHA-1 [3]
Based on cipher mode cipher mode AES components hash mode
Keysetup 616 644 1032 1346
Finalization 1440 1444 416 3351
Message processing 26 31 10.6 15
Area in GE (estimate) 4764 6812 4424 8120 [18]
Table 2: The comparison of some practical MAC functions.
the devices with a lower operating frequency, the static power consumption is the most significant. For
this reason, the area of gate equivalents is often used as a simplified benchmark for energy efficiency.
The comparison in Table 2 shows that ALPHA-MAC has merits on both of the message processing
speed and the area of GE, which indicates that one could also build a time and energy efficient MAC
from the ALRED construction by using a lightweight block cipher.
5 Two New Lightweight MACs from ALRED
In this section, first we will propose a lightweight MAC variant from a modification of the ALRED
construction, which is named TuLP. To raise the security bound of resisting internal collisions, we also
give a wide-pipe version of TuLP, which is called TuLP-128. Both our schemes use the experiences of
ALPHA-MAC [16] and Pelican [17]. Next, a security analysis of our schemes will be given. Finally,
the performance of our lightweight schemes will be analyzed. Compared to the results in Table 2,
our new MAC functions are time-efficient with less memory usage, and also energy-efficient in the
number of gate equivalents.
5.1 TuLP and TuLP-128
By using the components of the block cipher PRESENT [13], first a new MAC function TuLP is
built from the ALRED construction. TuLP is a lightweight MAC function with an 80-bit key length
at maximum and 64-bit block length, which consists of the following steps:
1. Padding. Let k be an authentication key such that |k| ≤ 80bits. If |k| is less than 80 bits, it
should be iteratively padded with 1 or 0 as 10101 · · · . First pad M with λ(M,k) where λ(M,k)
returns the concatenation of bitwise lengths of M and k. Then pad the concatenated string to a
multiple of 64 bits, e.g., appending a single bit 1 followed by necessary d bits 0. Finally Split
the result pad(M) into 64-bit blocks m1,m2, · · · ,mt, t = |pad(M)|64 , such that
pad(M) =M ||λ(M,k)||10d.
2. Initialization. Apply one full-round PRESENT encryption E to the initial value IV with the
(padded) authentication key k, such that
s0 = Ek(IV).
Obtain the output s0 as the initial state.
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3. Compression. For each message block mi where i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , t}, xor mi with the current
state si as the 64 most significant bits of the key ki for current r times PRESENT round function
ρ. The rest 16 bits of the key ki is derived from the 16 most significant bits of the authentication
key k (denote by MSB16(k)). By executing the same key schedule algorithm of PRESENT,
apply r PRESENT round functions on the state si−1, such that
si = ρrmi⊕si−1||MSB16(k)(si−1).
4. Finalization. Apply one full-round PRESENT encryption to the state st under the key k, and
then truncate the first `m bits of the final state st+1 as the tag of the message M .
st+1 = Ek(st), tagM = Trunc`m(st+1).
Since the width of the intermediate state of TuLP is only 64 bits, it is not enough to resist the
birthday attack on internal states for key non-recovery forgery. Although this “weakness” is not fatal
in some applications of BSN, we still provide a wide-pipe version, which is called TuLP-128, to
increase the state and the maximum tag length to be 128-bit length. The key length of TuLP-128 is up
to 160 bits. We note that the design principle is inspired by MDC-2 and the padding rule is identical
to TuLP.
1. Padding. Let k be an authentication key such that |k| ≤ 160bits. If |k| is less than 160 bits, it
should be iteratively padded with 1 or 0 as 10101 · · · . First pad M with λ(M,k) where λ(M,k)
returns the concatenation of bitwise lengths of M and k. Then pad the concatenated string to a
multiple of 64 bits, e.g., appending a single bit 1 followed by necessary d bits 0. Split the result
pad(M) into 64-bit blocks m1,m2, · · · ,mt, t = |pad(M)|64 , such that
pad(M) =M ||λ(M,k)||10d.
2. State Initialization. Splitted the (padded) authentication key k into two 80-bit key kl||kr. Then
apply one full-round PRESENT encryption to two 64-bit different initial values IV1 and IV2
under kl and kr, respectively. Obtain the outputs as the left and right initial states sl,0 and sr,0.
sl,0 = Ekl(IV1), sr,0 = Ekr(IV2).
3. Compression. For each message block mi where i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , t}, first split the last left and
right states sl,i−1 and sr,i−1 into four 32-bit blocks, exchange the least significant 32 bits of
the left state (denoted by LSB32(.)) with the most significant 32 bits of the right state. The
exchanged input states are denoted by sˆl,i−1 and sˆr,i−1. Then apply r PRESENT round func-
tions with the left and right input states, respectively. The left and right pipes execute the same
compression in TuLP independently.
sˆl,i−1 = MSB32(sl,i−1)||MSB32(sr,i−1),
sˆr,i−1 = LSB32(sl,i−1)||LSB32(sr,i−1);
sl,i = ρrmi⊕sl,i−1||MSB16(kl)(sˆl,i−1),
sr,i = ρrmi⊕sr,i−1||MSB16(kr)(sˆr,i−1).
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4. Finalization. Apply one full-round PRESENT encryptions to the left and the right states under
the splitted keys kl and kr respectively. Then truncate the first `m bits of the concatenation of
the final states as the tag of the message M .
sˆl,t = MSB32(sl,t)||MSB32(sr,t),
sˆr,t = LSB32(sl,t)||LSB32(sr,t);
sl,t+1 = Ekl(sˆl,t), sr,t+1 = Ekr(sˆr,t);
tagM = Trunc`m(sl,t+1||sr,t+1).
Figure 5 and 6 depict the high-level algorithms of TuLP and TuLP-128, respectively. Referring
to the issues of ALPHA-MAC and Pelican [9, 14, 33], the advantages of our schemes are as follows.
• In ALPHA-MAC [16], all message blocks directly become the round keys after the message
injections, so the attacker can execute side-channel attacks in the known message scenario.
Biryukov et al. [9] present a side-channel attack on ALPHA-MAC, which relies on the fact
that the round keys of ALPHA-MAC are public-known by the attacker. In TuLP, round keys
are not computed from a deterministic function of input message blocks. Thus, a side-channel
attack is unlikely to make a hypothesis on any intermediate states of the algorithm. The xor
operation between the state and the input message block can resist the attacker to implement
similar side-channel attacks [9] on TuLP and TuLP-128.
• Like in Pelican [17], the message injection layer is also removed in TuLP and TuLP-128 for
simplicity. Because it can hardly improve the resistance against linear and differential attacks.
In Pelican, the message block is xored with the last output state as the input for current round.
But in our schemes, the message block is xored with the state as a part of the subkey for next
round. We note that the iteration of Ek⊕m(k) is proven to be collision and preimage resistant in
the black-box analysis by Black et al. [12].
• The bitwise lengths of message and key are appended to the end of the message. This message
padding rule can avoid some trivial attacks on the internal collision and the extension. ALPHA-
MAC and Pelican only pad message with a single 1 followed by the minimum number of 0 bits
to suffice a block.
• Benefit from the ALRED construction, the security of our schemes can be reduced to the secu-
rity of PRESENT if internal collisions are not involved. The proofs are provided in the security
analysis of Section 5.2. Since the compressions in TuLP and TuLP-128 are different from the
PRESENT encryption, encryption and authentication can use the same secret key.
• TuLP is designed for rapid message processing. The computational costs of the message pro-
cessing is equivalent to r31 of one PRESENT encryption. Whilst TuLP-128 provides a wider
intermediate state and maximum 128-bit tag length for collision resistance, such that the costs
of message processing only requires 2·r31 of one PRESENT encryption.
• The choice of r rounds PRESENT in the compression is tunable by consideration of the prac-
tical balance of security and performance. Since key management in sensor network is expen-
sive on computation and energy, the length of authentication key is tunable since the message
padding rules considered dynamic key length. To give practical instances for the analysis in the
following section, we will consider r = 16 in the compression of TuLP and TuLP128, where
IV = IV1 = 0123456789ABCDEF and IV2 = FEDCBA9876543210.
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5.2 Security Analysis
In this section, we first prove that TuLP is as strong as the PRESENT block cipher with respect to key
recovery and existential forgery attacks without internal collisions. Then we give a synthetic analysis
of TuLP when internal collisions are considered.
Since the ALRED construction has a similar internal structure with the CBC mode, which typi-
cally implies the security between the construction and the underlying cryptographic primitives. De-
rived from the provability results of the ALRED construction in [16], it is easy to derive a similar
result on TuLP as follows.
Theorem 3 Any key recovery attack on TuLP requiring t (adaptively) chosen messages, can be con-
verted to a key recovery attack on the PRESENT block cipher requiring t + 1 adaptively chosen
plaintexts.
Proof. Let A be a successful attacker requiring t tag values corresponding to t (adaptively) chosen
messages mi yielding the key k, where i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , t}. Then we derive a key recovery attack on the
PRESENT block cipher as follows.
1. Request the first state s0 = Ek(IV).
2. For i = 1 to t, compute the intermediate state si = χ(s0,mi), where χ denotes the compression
function of TuLP.
3. For i = 1 to t, request tagi = Trunc(Ek(si)).
4. Submit t tag values to A to recover the key k.
The above attack requires t chosen messages and one chosen message on Ek(IV). So the theorem
follows. ¤
Similar to Theorem 3, the provability of TuLP can be extended to the existential forgery attack
and the fixed point attack as follows.
Lemma 1 Any existential forgery attack on TuLP without internal collisions requiring t (adaptively)
chosen messages, can be converted to a ciphertext guessing attack on the PRESENT block cipher
requiring t+ 1 adaptively chosen plaintexts.
Proof. Let A be a successful attacker requiring t tag values tagi corresponding to t (adaptively)
chosen messages mi yielding another tag tag′ under message m′, where i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , t}. Then we
derive a ciphertext guessing attack on the PRESENT block cipher as follows.
1. Request the first state s0 = Ek(IV).
2. For i = 1 to t, compute si = χ(s0,mi), where χ denotes the compression function of TuLP.
3. For i = 1 to t, request tagi = Trunc(Ek(si)).
4. Submit t tag values toA to obtain an existential forgery tag′, tag′ should also be a valid cipher-
text on the message m′.
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The above attack requires t chosen messages and one chosen message on Ek(IV). So the lemma fol-
lows. ¤
Lemma 2 Any existential forgery attack on TuLP with a fixed point {(m, s)|Em⊕s(s) = s,m ∈
M, s ∈ K} requiring t (adaptively) chosen messages, can be converted to a fixed point attack
{(m′, k)|Em′(k) = k,m ∈ M, k ∈ K} on the PRESENT block cipher requiring t + 1 adaptively
chosen plaintexts.
Proof. Let A be a successful attacker requiring t tag values corresponding to t (adaptively) chosen
messages mi yielding a fixed point fp, where i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , t}. Then we derive a fixed point attack
on the PRESENT block cipher as follows.
1. Request the first state s0 = Ek(IV).
2. For i = 1 to t, compute si = χ(s0,mi), where χ denotes the compression function of TuLP.
3. For i = 1 to t, request tagi = Trunc(Ek(si)).
4. Submit t tag values to A to obtain a fixed point such that Ek(si) = si.
The above attack requires t chosen messages and one chosen message on Ek(IV). So the lemma fol-
lows. ¤
Now we analyze the security with respect to internal collisions. The reason why we choose
r = 16 in the compression of TuLP (and TuLP-128) to resist the internal collisions from the linear
and differential cryptanalysis are briefly described as follows.
Theorem 4 Consider r = 16 in the compression of TuLP. The minimum extinguishing differential
in TuLP imposes a differential characteristic of about 2−64. Whilst the maximum bias of the linear
analysis with the probability of about 2−28 with 256 known plaintext/ciphertext pairs.
Proof. Based on the differential and the linear cryptanalyses that are given by Bogdanov et al. [13],
any 5 rounds differential characteristic of PRESENT has a minimum of 10 active S-boxes. One round
PRESENT has one S-box, all 31 rounds use the same. For differential cryptanalysis, we have:
1. One S-box provides maximum 2−2 possibility for differential characteristic, thus 16 rounds pro-
vide a lower bound (2−2)r∗10/5 ≈ 2−64 for the probability of a characteristic. The probability
is not greater than the birthday attack on the intermediate states (2−32 and 2−64 for TuLP and
TuLP-128 respectively).
2. This differential cryptanalysis would require the memory complexity of about 264 known plain-
text/ciphertext pairs.
For linear cryptanalysis, we have:
1. Any 4 rounds provide the maximal bias of a linear approximation ²4R ≤ 2−7. Hence 16 rounds
provide maximum bias of a linear approximation (2−7)r/4 = 2−28.
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2. This linear cryptanalysis would require the memory complexity of about 1/(2−28)2 = 256 (219
TB) known plaintext/ciphertext pairs.
So the theorem follows. ¤
Consider a typical BSN application consisting of 100 nodes. If each node transfers an 8-byte
message per 15 seconds for monitoring, the time consumption of obtaining 256 plaintext/ciphertext
pairs for the linear analysis would be impractical.
By using multi-collisions, Knudsen et al. [23] provide a collision attack and preimage attacks
on the MDC-2 construction with the time complexities of about (log2(n)/n) · 2n and 2n where the
block length is n. The preimage attacks make new trade-offs so that the most efficient attack requires
time and memory of about 2n. Whilst the meet-in-the-middle attack on MDC-2 [24] requires time and
memory about 23n/2 and 2n. Based on the security analysis of the MDC-2 construction and TuLP, the
security of TuLP-128 with the internal collisions is as follows.
Theorem 5 Consider r = 16 in the compression of TuLP-128. The internal collision and preimage
attacks on TuLP-128 have the complexties of about 261.3 and 264, respectively.
Proof. The proof is based on the security of r = 16 in the compression of TuLP-128. One S-box
provides a maximum 2−2 possibility for differential characteristic, 16 PRESENT round functions
provide a lower bound 2−64 for the probability of a characteristic. The minimum extinguishing dif-
ferential in TuLP-128 imposes a differential characteristic of about 2−64 in the left state and the same
in the right state. 16 rounds provide a maximum bias of a linear approximation 2−28. But both the
differential analysis and the linear cryptanalysis require a memory complexity no less than 256 known
plaintext/ciphertext pairs, which is impractical in BSN. Since PRESENT is an SP-network block ci-
pher and the iteration of Ek⊕m(k) is proven to be collision and preimage resistant in the black-box
analysis by Black et al. [12], and TuLP-128 has a MDC-2 like construction. Each round of the com-
pression in TuLP-128 exchanges the right most 32 bits of the left state with the left-most 32 bits of the
right state. Due to Knudsen et al.’s cryptanalysis of MDC-2 [23], the internal collision attack and the
preimage attack on TuLP-128 would require the time complexity of about (log2(64)/64) ·264 ≈ 261.3
and 264, respectively. Therefore, the complexity of an internal collision is about 2−61.3 via the multi-
collision attack with a negligible memory requirement. Whilst the preimage attack requires time and
memory of about 264. So the theorem follows. ¤
Although TuLP-128 doesn’t achieve the ideal upper bounds of collision and preimage resis-
tances, the MDC-2 like structure in TuLP-128 also yields practical advantages. For example, sym-
metric left and right pipes can minize the area, and the simple permutation layer between left and
right states saves extra logical gates. Nevertheless, a 261.3 level of time complexity on finding an in-
ternal collision is still beyond the computational bound in practice. Now we consider the security of
TuLP-128 without internal collisions.
Theorem 6 Any key recovery attack on TuLP-128 requiring t (adaptively) chosen messages, can be
converted to a key recovery attack on PRESENT requiring t+ 2 adaptively chosen plaintexts.
Proof. Consider the situation that kl = kr = k. Let A be a successful attacker requiring t tag values
corresponding to t (adaptively) chosen messages mi yielding the key k, where i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , t}. Let
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ρ be the compression function of TuLP. MSB32(·) and LSB32(·) denote the truncation of the most
and the least significant 32 bits, respectively. Then we derive a key recovery attack on the PRESENT
block cipher as follows.
1. Request the first left and right states sl,0 = Ek(IV1) and sr,0 = Ek(IV2).
2. For i = 1 to t, compute the left intermediate state sl,i = χ(MSB32(sl,i)||MSB32(sr,i),mi),
and the right intermediate state sr,i = χ(LSB32(sl,i)||LSB32(sr,i),mi), where χ denotes the
compression function of TuLP.
3. For i = 1 to t, request tagi = Trunc(Ek(sl,i)||Ek(sr,i)).
4. Submit t tag values to A to recover the key k.
The above attack needs t chosen messages except Ek(IV1) and Ek(IV2). So the theorem follows. ¤
Based on the proofs of Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, it is easy to obtain the following lemmas on
TuLP-128. The proofs are omitted here for brevity.
Lemma 3 Any existential forgery attack on TuLP-128 without internal collisions of requiring t (adap-
tively) chosen messages, can be converted to a ciphertext guessing attack on PRESENT requiring
t+ 2 adaptively chosen plaintexts.
Lemma 4 Any existential forgery attack on TuLP-128 with a fixed point of requiring t (adaptively)
chosen messages, can be converted to a fixed point attack on PRESENT requiring t + 2 adaptively
chosen plaintexts.
5.3 Performance
Before we study the performance of TuLP and TuLP-128, first we realize an optimized implemen-
tation of PRESENT by using 1K bytes look-up table on MICAz nodes. Our implementation of
PRESENT is the first software result in the literature. From our performance experiments, we find
that the bit permutation of PRESENT is costly in software implementation. Compared to the best
known result of AES software implementation on MICAz nodes [20], our optimized implementation
of PRESENT still shows a competitive speed and lower memory costs. Since PRESENT has al-
ready been proven to be a better choice than AES in hardware implementation [14], our optimized
implementation shows that PRESENT is also practical in software.
Software (MICAz) Hardware [14]
Algorithm RAM ROM Processing speed per block Logic process Cycles per block Area in GE
AES [14, 20] 1915 12720 1.46ms 0.35µm 1032 3400
PRESENT-80 1040 1926 1.82ms 0.18µm 32 1570
Table 3: The comparison of the implementations of AES and PRESENT.
Subsequently, we choose the DM-PRESENT [14], which is derived from the Davies-Meyer con-
struction and the PRESENT with an 80-bit key, as the underlying hash function to build up a compa-
rable algorithm from the HMAC [3]. We also choose PRESENT-based CBC-MAC as a benchmark
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for comparability. The area in GE is estimated by using the Virtual Silicon (VST) standard cell library
based on UMC L180 0.18µm 1P6M Logic Process (UMCL18G212T3). All experiments are based
the MICAz nodes (TinyOS version 2.10), which are popular in both of WSN and BSN. The results
in the entries of processing speed (in milliseconds) are averaged by iterating 100 times experiments
with/without the optimization in the keysetup.
TuLP TuLP-128 CBC-MAC (PRESENT) HMAC (DM-PRESENT)
Key Length (bits) 80 160 80 80
Intermediate State (bits) 64 128 64 64
RAM / ROM Costs (bits) 1048 / 3302 1056 / 3718 1040 / 2970 1056 / 3484
Area in GE (estimate) 2250 2566 2252 2213 [14]
Processing Speed (ms) TuLP TuLP-128 CBC-MAC (PRESENT) HMAC (DM-PRESENT)
8 bytes 4.46 / 6.63 8.91 / 13.24 6.51 10.90
16 bytes 5.59 / 7.75 11.17 / 15.49 8.70 13.08
32 bytes 7.87 / 10.03 15.72 / 20.05 13.05 17.43
64 bytes 12.39 / 14.56 24.76 / 29.09 21.77 23.97
128 bytes 21.43 / 23.59 42.84 / 47.17 39.20 37.04
256 bytes 39.50 / 41.67 79.00 / 83.33 74.06 65.35
512 bytes 75.65 / 77.81 151.53 / 155.66 143.78 122.01
1024 bytes 147.94 / 150.10 295.97 / 300.31 283.21 233.04
Table 4: The comparison amongst some PRESENT-based MAC functions.
If we choose r = 16 in the compression of TuLP, TuLP will be about 2 times faster than
PRESENT encryption in message processing. Table 4 shows that TuLP approaches 1.6 and 1.8
times faster than HMAC with DM-PRESENT and PRESENT-based CBC-MAC respectively, where
message length from 8 bytes to 1024 bytes. The keysetup costs in our schemes, which require one
(or two) PRESENT encryption(s) to generate an encrypted IV, mainly lacks TuLP (or TuLP-128)
in processing the messages shorter than 32 bytes. We note that the keysetup costs can be optimized
by precomputing the encrypted IV before the authentications with the same keys, and the values can
be reused in the latter authentication with the same keys. Same optimization can be implemented
in TuLP-128 to boost the processing of short messages. We note that HMAC also can precompute
the initialization values for optimization, but the values must be treated and protected (128 bits for a
certain key in DM-PRESENT) in the same manner as secret keys [3]. While the optimization for our
schemes only increases a smaller storage (one encrypted IV is 64-bit) and no need to be insulated. Al-
though the lengths of intermediate state and output are doubled, the performance of TuLP-128 is still
comparable to PRESENT-based CBC-MAC. Obviously, TuLP-128 will be faster than HMAC with
PRESENT in a double block length construction. Nevertheless, if a higher security bound is required,
one can tune the rounds in the compressions of TuLP and TuLP-128. For instance, increase 16 rounds
to 20 will cost about 4/16 = 25% performance in message processing. Whilst a 20-round differential
characteristic of PRESENT still has a probability 2−50, and the linear approximation would require
of about 270 known plaintext/ciphertext with a bias 2−35.
6 Conclusion
By considering the restrictions of BSN, two lightweight MACs TuLP and TuLP-128 have been pro-
posed. The security of our schemes is analyzed with respect to the cryptanalyses on ALRED and
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the results on PRESENT. The statistics strongly support that TuLP and TuLP-128 will be efficient
and low-energy costs in devices with constrained resources. The provability of our schemes depends
on the quality of the cryptanalysis that has been previously performed on those building blocks. The
key length and the number of round functions in the compression are parameterized in our lightweight
MACs, which support tunable tradeoffs between security and performance in BSN applications. Since
both PRESENT and ALRED are new proposals, we suggest that rigorous analysis should be imposed
to avoid any potential weakness inside the cryptosystems based on them.
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